This article uses a case study from Queensland to demonstrate the court politics approach's potential to reinvigorate executive studies. Court politics focuses on webs of interdependence within the core executive. It examines the beliefs and practices of elite actors and their fluid and contingent relationships. This article examines the patterns of executive politics that prevailed under Premier Anna Bligh. It seeks to answer three key questions. First, why is court politics a useful approach to studying the Australian core executive? Second, what is the nature and extent of court politics in Australian state governments? Finally, recognising that local traditions shape the beliefs and practices of political elites, how does the court politics approach need to be modified for application in Australia?
Introduction
Australian political scientists have explored the core executive only episodically. Rhodes and Wanna's (2009: 129-30) review of the literature including textbooks, journalism, biographies and memoirs led them to conclude there was little research on Australian executive politics; it was 'almost devoid of theory, even controversies'. Other characteristics include: the predominance of realpolitik in accounts of executive power and a tendency to emphasise 'practice over theory, commentary over fieldwork, and teaching over research '. Weller (2005: 37) concurs. He notes the academic literature provides 'slim pickings for a reader who wants to know how the executive system of government works in Australia'. The challenge for Australian political scientists, therefore, is to provide theoretically informed studies of the political executive based on original fieldwork. 1 Strangio et al. (2013) also call for a greater focus on the political executive. They exhort the next generation of scholars to pursue an 'integrated approach to the study of prime ministerial leadership, focusing on the interplay between political circumstances, institutional possibilities, individual characteristics and social relations at the apex of executive government' (Strangio et al. 2013: 6, emphasis in original) .
This article offers theory and fieldwork. We argue for a focus on court politics and we illustrate our argument with a case study of the court politics of Queensland under Labor premier Anna Bligh. We pose three key questions. First, why is court politics a useful approach in the study of the core executive in Australian governments? Second, what is the nature and extent of court politics in state politics? Finally, recognising that local traditions shape and inform the beliefs and practices of political elites, how does the court politics approach need to be modified for application in Australia? We highlight four dilemmas that characterised the court politics of Queensland's central networks. These are:
. Contingency, which continuously frustrates agenda-setting and other efforts to plan for the medium-term; . The problem of fragmentation and coordination, which arguably is greater because of states' service-delivery responsibilities; . The primacy of coping and survival in the calculus of political-administrative elites, especially as electoral defeat looms; and . The tendency of a besieged leader to rely on an ever-decreasing circle of close advisers who, because of their close relationship with and loyalty to the leader, cannot or are unwilling to offer alternative advice.
We also identify those features of the court politics approach that work in Australia and highlight some differences arising from local traditions and practices. These key differences are: the physical location of network members; the greater number of partisan staff near to leaders; and the close and closed relationships among network members over the course of long-term governments.
The court politics of the core executive Court politics have existed throughout the ages (Campbell 2010) , but in its current reincarnation the idea marries the core executive to the analysis of prime ministerial predominance and to the study of statecraft. 2 It focuses on the beliefs and practices of core executive actors. Practices are actions that display a stable pattern: they are what a group of people do. We interpret these actions by ascribing beliefs to them. Practices presuppose apt beliefs, and beliefs do not make sense without the practices to which they refer. So, a government department is a set of embedded practices; so too a cabinet, a premier's or prime minister's office.
Beliefs and practices are passed on through inherited traditions. Central to analysis of traditions is the notion of situated agency: individuals use local reasoning consciously and subconsciously to reflect on and modify their contingent heritage. So, analysis shifts to people's beliefs and practices, the traditions in which they are located, and the games interdependent people play to resolve dilemmas. A dilemma arises when a new idea stands in opposition to existing beliefs or practices, forcing individuals or institutions to reconsider their existing beliefs and associated tradition. To accept a new belief is to pose a dilemma that asks questions of existing traditions (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 2006) . The court politics approach's emphasis on the beliefs, practices, traditions and dilemmas of courts provides the organising concepts to systematically explore how they work.
Court politics exists as journalists' reportage, in politicians' autobiographies, biographies, diaries and memoirs. 3 The nearest usage to that employed here is that of Savoie (2008: 16-17) . He defines the court as 'the prime minister and a small group of carefully selected courtiers'. It also covers the 'shift from formal decision-making processes in cabinet … to informal processes involving only a handful of actors'. In a similar vein, Dexter (1977: 268) describes the collection of courtiers continuously related to one another and dependent on the top person. Such views of court politics are too narrow. We prefer Cowling's more expansive focus on the intentions and actions of a political leadership network consisting of 'fifty or sixty politicians in conscious tension with one another whose accepted authority constituted political leadership'. Court politics was 'a matter of rhetoric and manoeuvre' by statesmen (Cowling 1971: 3-4) . Similarly Williamson (1999: 12-18) understands the study of court politics 'in the interpretative, not simple descriptive, sense, where the narrative is not of one politician nor even of one party, but rather of the whole system of political leadership'. Even with these more expansive definitions, the number of participants is still limited. As well as the core network or inner circle, however, we can talk of circles of influence (Bennister 2012; Hennessy 2000: 493-500) . In the more formal language of political science, the court is a set of interlocking, interdependent networks. For example, Burch and Holliday (1996) suggest that the prime minister is at the core of the core networks supported by enhanced central capacity that increases his or her potential power. In other words, the inner court is personal but it is embedded in interlocking networks that encompass their support staff, whether public servants or political staffers.
When the idea of court politics is married to the analysis of beliefs, practices, traditions and dilemmas, it ceases to be mere metaphor. It focuses attention on the contingencies, personalities and the ebb-and-flow of conflicts and negotiations between interdependent actors in the overlapping networks that constitute the core executive. Court politics also offers useful insights into the problems of effective government. Courts perform essential coordination and management tasks that hold the centre together. The court sets priorities and coordinates the policy process by filtering proposals. In the quest for coherence, it contains and manages conflicts. It acts as the keeper of the government's narrative, and is gatekeeper and broker for internal and external networks. Its power ebbs and flows with that of the prime minister (Rhodes 2013 (Rhodes , 2014 .
For Walter (2010: 9-10) , 'court politics' implies small, closed group decision-making. He is concerned about potential dysfunctions: poor decision-making, an inability and unwillingness to engage in 'rigorous reality-testing' and other pathologies, if this mode of decision-making should become routine. Rhodes and Tiernan (2014: 196-204) report the siege mentality that gripped Julia Gillard's court as she faced the extreme contingency of a minority government, relentless destabilisation from her predecessor and the missteps of her own supporters as they became insular and defensive. For Savoie (2008: 230, 339) , the key adverse consequences are centralisation and the collapse of accountability.
There are also more prosaic but no less important consequences: the loss of institutional memory (Rhodes and Tiernan 2014) . Rhodes and Wanna (2008: 25) agree: 'senior civil servants no longer have the experience, the knowledge or the institutional memory to speak truth to power'. It is a mistake, however, to focus only on the pathologies of court politics. 't Hart (2014: 76-81) distinguishes usefully between the court as think tank, as sanctuary, as arena and as ritual. We need to tease out the patterns in court politics and the intended and unintended consequences of those patterns. 't Hart's suggestions do not exhaust the possibilities: for example, the court as ceremony and myth. As will become clear, our case highlights the court as siege but that should not obscure the fact that court politics come in many varieties.
Research methods
This article draws on a larger study that assesses the nature and extent of court politics in Australia. It examines the everyday working practices of ministerial 'courts': the individuals, offices and units that collectively comprise the system of support for ministers, with the aim of identifying their beliefs, practices, rituals and routines.
Observing the court politics of the core executive is challenging because of the secretive nature of government decision-making. There are now several ethnographic studies of governing elites, however, so it can be done. 4 We use a distinctive mix of methods, drawn from the toolkit of ethnography (Rhodes 2015) . Participant observation is a key tool of anthropology, but there are several ways of collecting the stories of elite respondents who have 'been there'. They include intensive repeat interviews, focus groups, informal conversation and analysis of official documents, biographies and memoirs, oral histories, interviews and speeches to recover beliefs and stories. These stories are the institutional memory of government departments: a retelling of yesterday to make sense of today. They serve to socialise officials to 'how things work around here', they play a similar role with ministers and their staff who bring their own stories to the task of governing.
The defeat of the Bligh Labor government in March 2012 offered an opportunity to conduct interviews with members of its various central networks. We conducted 25 semi-structured interviews (ranging between 90 minutes and two hours in duration) with a sample equally divided between ministers, senior officials and political staffers. In several cases, we conducted repeat interviews with respondents. We draw also on data from media interviews with Bligh and former members of her government. Finally, we had access to the review of the 2012 Queensland election campaign (Wright et al. 2012) ; to documents and testimony to the Commission of Inquiry into the Queensland Health payroll initiated by former Liberal-National Party Premier Campbell Newman; and to Bligh's (2015) recently published memoir.
Court politics in Queensland: the inheritance
Queensland's unicameral parliament provides few checks on the power of the executive and sustains a tradition of long-term majoritarian governments. This combination of executive dominance and personalised governance has fostered a political culture that favours the 'strong leader' tradition of the premier as 'the boss' (Davis 1995) . Coordinating routines adopted in the wake of the landmark Fitzgerald Inquiry into political corruption were codified in a Cabinet Handbook, and managed through the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (DPC). More personnel and resources reinforced the capacity and disposition of successive Queensland premiers to centralise and dominate (Davis 1995; Scott et al. 2001: 249-52) . The emphasis on 'routines' permeates the stories of Queensland ministers and officials, notwithstanding that few of them had direct experience of prior arrangements. Davis (1995) identifies three domains of coordination within Queensland government: the political, the policy and the administrative. Each comprises distinct groups of 'players' supported by routines, which Davis describes as 'the standard repertoire of institutions, those rules and codes which guide action and give effect to values ' (1995: 28) . Within the central networks these domains overlap and cluster around the premier. Supporting routines and regular meetings bring the players together so at the centre, cabinet decision-making is coordinated and well-informed.
Queensland's strong leader tradition has ensured a prominent role for DPC since its establishment in 1859 (Scott et al. 2001 ). DPC and the premier's private office comprise the centre of Queensland's core executive networks, but it is important to distinguish the administrative from the political domainalthough they are in almost constant contact. Under Bligh the premier's office had 32 ministerial staffa mix of personal appointees covering administrative, policy, political and media advising roles mirroring DPC, providing the premier with partisan support and briefing about issues across government. Bligh noted the inevitability of a leader relying on a small core group:
if you really look at the people who have influence over a Premier, or a minister, it's really down to about five or six. The Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the media staffin my office, I had four. So, it's a handful of people who have daily contact with you and who help you form your views and influence your thinking.
As premier from 2007 to 2012, Bligh maintained a cabinet of 18. The routine was a weekly Monday meeting in the cabinet room in the Executive Building, which also houses DPC and the premier's office.
Within the administrative domain the Director-General (DG) of DPC is Queensland's most senior public servant. Bligh had two departmental DGs, Ken Smith -mid-2011 ) and John Bradley (2011 . His responsibilitiesthere has never been a female headinvariably come as a surprise to the new appointee, who perhaps envisaged the job as driving policy across government. Instead, he is the ultimate coordinator: the 'fixer' of a litany of problems and conflicts that cannot be resolved elsewhere. According to a senior official:
The reality is that [DGs of DPC] are often caught up in the minutia of small problems that if unsolved could become big problems. So, instead of their job being to sit back and have big ideas and write big policy papers, their job is running from crisis to crisis and fixing things whether it be on behalf of the premier, whether it be something that's in the Courier-Mail, whether it be a problem in another Director-General's office. It doesn't matter what it is, often times their day is caught up with what seem to be small issues, but [which] if escalated, would be quite terrible issues and managing the personalities of all of thatand that's not even bringing into account the private sector and other businesses and things like that who are looking to that person as their key interface with the Premier and the key influence.
As this comment suggests, the DG of the DPC plays a major coordinating role across the policy and administrative domains. He is supported in this task by senior departmental officers and importantly, by his own private office. 5 The DG chairs key coordinating forums. These include the weekly CEO Leadership Team meeting of all DGs; the Performance Leadership Group (which dealt with and advised the premier on CEO performance agreements) and the State Disaster Management Group (SDMG). A member of the DG's court described his job as follows:
So he has a job almostin a funny way, as a call centre and a central problem solver. The busyness of his job will often be a reflection of the relationship of the other directors-general and their ministers and the relationship of the other ministers with the Premier's office. So sometimes, depending on the dynamic, his job changes in relation to the dynamics that exist in those other systems.
A noticeable feature of Queensland's courts is that their members are always together because of co-location and government routines. The governing elite is relatively small. It became smaller when machinery-of-government changes reduced the number of DGs from 24 to 13. Labor held office in Queensland for almost 20 years, from 1989 to 2012. Thus, court members had known each other a long time. In the political domain they were often contemporaries from university; grew up in the same towns; had children at the same schools; were part of the same professional networks; and had friends or associates in common. They had forged long professional relationships. As a university student, Bligh's Treasurer Andrew Fraser, completed an internship with Neil Roberts, later a Cabinet colleague. Fraser was a junior staffer to Peter Beattie in Opposition and in Beattie's premier's office, where he met and dealt with public servants who would later advise him.
Under Labor, the political-administrative elite met regularly. They travelled together, usually on the government jet, to Community Cabinet meetings held across the state, Council of Australian Governments and other intergovernmental meetings. Bligh's DG Ken Smith, explained that as head of DPC: I met with the premier twice a day, morning and afternoon and then basically often in between times with meetings with ministers, with a range of meetings around crisis situations. We were on the same floor in the Executive Building. The phone would ringyour time literally wasn't your own. Whereas, if I was running a line department, I literally managed my own diary. I could travel within the state; I could go and visit schools; I could do a range of things. In the central agency, I had to always be there and in fact, even during times of disasters. It wasn't my role to get up in a helicopter, or to go and visit a particular community … I had to be there to chair a process and then communicate with the premier about what was happening.
Such frequent, often informal interaction contrasts sharply with experience in Canberra. The DG of DPC sits at 'the pointy end' of the political-administrative interface. By proximity and routine there is frequent interaction with the premier's office. Bligh's Chief of Staff Nicole Scurrah reported the she saw 'a lot of the DG'. She explained the face-to-face interaction and on-going dialogue helped to clarify the premier's priorities: it facilitated coordination and enabled Bligh to be across the detail of her role. Because the task of supporting Queensland premiers is shared between political staff and public servants, it is both essential and inevitable that the DG of DPC is a member of the central courtbut the perspective he brings is administrative, distinct from but complementary to, that provided by senior ministerial colleagues and the Chief of Staff.
We found an inner and an outer court in Queensland's core executive (see Figure 1 ). There was the inner court of the premier comprising her Chief of Staff and private office, and selected senior ministers (Fraser and Paul Lucas). All three had their offices in the Executive Building. Such co-location facilitated closeness. The outer court comprised members of cabinet and its support staff. The Cabinet Secretary (an official, conventionally a senior executive service officer of DPC, who reports to the DG) was also part of this network, along with Cabinet Liaison and Legislation Officers (in each of the departments, each trying to maintain the integrity of government routines). Other members of this outer court included the Assistant Director-General Policy, the Executive Directors of Policy Division and the Deputy Director-General Governance. Finally, individual ministers had their departmental courts to support their links with the outer circle. These courts were clustered along and around George Street, mostly in walking distance of the premier's office.
Political staffers were key members of each court. As noted, Bligh's inner court had 32 appointments. Fraser had 14. Lucas had 12. In other ministers' offices the number of staffers varied from nine to 16. There were 223 in total (Queensland Government 2011: 13) . Strikingly, the Queensland government has many more advisers than British ministers who, on average, appoint two Special Advisers (SpAds), although the prime minister has significantly more. 6 Not only were there multiple courts, but each court was subject to change, often at the premier's behest. Bligh succeeded Beattie when he retired as premier in September 2007. She was elected unopposed (Bligh 2015: 149-54 ). Bligh only narrowly won the 2009 election. The small 'Strategy Group' that fought the 2009 campaign (Bligh, Fraser, Lucan and Scurrah) became the nucleus of Bligh's government from then until 2012. Bligh (2015: 161-75 ) emphasised the group's importance, the relationships and dynamics its members forged during the 2009 campaign. Her team had 'defied political gravity' to win 'against the backdrop of a powerful electoral mood for change'. Bligh's authority increased after her electoral victory, but she achieved neither Beattie's political authority within the government, nor his electoral popularity outside it. Victory enabled her to reshape the cabinet she had been forced to retain after her mid-term accession to the premiership: enemies and rivals were isolated. Bligh (2015: 162-63) argued such personnel and other changes were necessary because:
As we headed into that election, Labor had been in power for almost seventeen of the previous twenty years, and the electorate's hunger for change was palpable. It had dogged Peter Beattie in the lead up to the previous election … Having been denied change in 2006, the electorate was hungrier for it in 2009.
Inevitably, there were limits to Bligh's authority. In-government transitions are fraught because those who have been close to power under the former leader resent being sidelined. Beattie's decision to 'anoint' Bligh his successor denied her the legitimacy of winning a leadership ballot. It mattered because it stoked discontent. Like most leaders, Bligh was constrained in selecting her ministerial 'team'. She was forced to retain factional powerbroker Robert Schwarten as Minister for Public Works and Housing and to appoint his close ally Judy Spence as Leader of Government in the House. One respondent described the personal relations between Bligh and these two colleagues as 'very unpleasant': both were constant irritants and persistent critics. Serious internal tensions were contained rather than resolved, occasionally becoming public. For example, when Bligh authorised controversial changes that removed the powers of the Speaker of the Parliament, John Mickel, a rival from the right faction, he became an outspoken critic, both publicly and privately.
Bligh's memoir was published in March 2015. In the book, interviews and promotional appearances, the former premier claimed 'I have no interest in writing a back-stabbing, tell-all critique of my colleagues in public life' (Bligh 2015: x) . However, she concedes the process of remaking her cabinet involved a series of 'difficult conversations':
With a couple of exceptions, those who were not returned to the Cabinet held their pain as a grudge … When things were at their toughest for us in the years to come, it would be some of those I disappointed on that first day who would let us all down as they took their revenge on me, leaking to the media and betraying the party. (Bligh 2015: 176-77) To protect our several respondents, the following, brief 'composite' portrait of the Bligh court uses the unattributed words of three leading critics. We are not suggesting these views are accurate. However, they show the climate in which the Bligh court worked and that, to some extent, it engendered. To a significant degree it does not matter if the allegations are true because they changed behaviour both inside and outside the court. The court became 'defensive', the critics went public and Labor politics became tribal, even feral. So the consequences of criticism were real.
Our respondents characterised the Bligh court as 'highly centralised', and claimed it was the premier's fault because in contrast to Beattie, she was 'not a people person'. Bligh was 'awkward', 'transactional' and even 'cold' in her dealings with people. Members of the court were 'bullies', prone to undermining those who disagreed or questioned them. There was little or 'no respect or deference for ministers' who were 'bypassed', 'micromanaged' and sometimes abused by the premier's office. The court was 'tribal' and 'media driven'. Critics claimed that Bligh and Lucas were career politicians who trod the increasingly well-worn path to government from Young Labor. Hence, according to one 'I always maintained we didn't get a premier. We got a student union leader.'
The various proponents offered different accounts of why the court behaved as it did. For the court, it was 'an opportunity for renewal', a 'lack of talent', the need to rely on those who could be trusted and to 'never let one's guard down' given the government's dire electoral prospects. To critics the pathology was an insecure and increasingly insular leadership group. The court had to spend, some might say waste, much time managing tensions that, in part, it created through its very existence. 7
Dilemmas
This section highlights four dilemmas that characterised the court politics of Queensland's core executive under Bligh. We discuss the dilemmas under the headings of: contingency and agenda-setting; fragmentation and coordination; crises, coping and survival; and everdecreasing circles. These dilemmas demonstrate the utility of the court politics approach for analysing the dynamics of relationships in and between the core executive's central networks.
Contingency and agenda-setting
The spectre of defeat loomed over Bligh's government after she failed to secure the majority of votes at the 2009 election. She had gone to the polls early, cognisant the budget was deteriorating rapidly after the global financial crisis. Constrained by an earlier commitment to maintain capital spending to sustain employment, but under pressure from Ratings Agencies about the extent of the state's borrowings, Bligh, from the Australian Labor Party (ALP's) Left faction, was forced to privatise state assets. The option was canvassed by the strategy group, initially without consultation with the cabinet or the party room, although the final decision was taken by the full cabinet. Bligh maintains that ministers understood the profundity of the decision for the Labor Party. The unions, Labor's traditional base and a key funder, were outraged. Bligh describes a meeting with union officials in the premier's office on the afternoon after the cabinet meeting where everyone was 'grieving', 'sorrowful and ashen-faced ' (2015: 183) .
The decision to privatise assets was similarly controversial with the media and the community. Bligh was alleged to have 'lied' to the people of Queensland by not revealing the budget position before the election and seeking a mandate for privatisation (see e.g. Wright et al. 2012: 12-15) . Bligh (2015: 178-86 ) rejects claims her government had a 'secret plan' to privatise state assets. She offers a passionate defence of her decisionmaking through the uncertainty of the global financial crisis, describing the rift with the 'entrenched industrialised male' union power base as 'an epic fight between the new and old guards of the Labor party' (Bligh 2015: 185) . 8 Having alienated its base and facing internal dissent, the government became defensive and reactive. Queensland's media market is small and concentrated, but 'feeding the media beast' dominated key court members' thinking. This constant preoccupation was reflected in the time Bligh's office devoted to media monitoring and planning. A senior staffer told us work began at 3.30am with a review of the national news, ahead of a 4.30am phone hook-up with the head of the Government Media Unit. Ministers reported similarly that media management dominated. They were lined up for interviews on early morning radio from home or in the car, to an increasingly hostile reception. Directors-General felt this pressure keenly because it escalated the demands from ministers' offices:
My day was governed by what was in the Courier-Mail in the morning or the 6 o'clock news at night. If they ran a story that was critical of the department, if I hadn't already had a phone call from the minister's office or one of his staffers, I soon would and for the first few hours, that's what I'd be concentrating on.
Bligh's staffers later conceded the ineffectiveness of this approach: '[By the end] we were jumping at shadows and that's what long-term government is about … . It's kind of like Stockholm Syndrome. We got to the point where we jumped at everything'. It is moot whether, in a different context and having secured re-election in her own right, Bligh might have asserted a more coherent policy direction. Almost immediately her government was confronted by one damn thing after another.
Between December 2010 and February 2011, a series of natural disasters devastated 80 per cent of Queensland's landmass. The government's response was effective, but the demands of dealing with a series of severe, unpredictable and geographically dispersed threats, understandably were enormous. It required twice-daily meetings of the SDMG and a huge response effort at the height of the crisis and its aftermath, and in recovery of affected communities. The beleaguered premier's decisive and empathetic leadership drew national and international plaudits. Some interviewees suggested that in this case, the court politics of a familiar and cohesive small group spanning the three domains of politics, policy and administration, worked well. Others commented on the premier's improved performance when on the road and away from her court.
Fragmentation and coordination
Sub-national governments are focused on delivering public services. They operate large and complex delivery systemsin cooperation and at times in conflict, with other tiers of government. The coordination challenges are immense: the potential for failures and mistakes is omnipresent. This potential is especially acute in Queensland, which is large, diverse and decentralised.
Queensland's 'strong leader' tradition, and entrenched tradition of government intervention, creates strong expectations, which have implications for administration and political management. The tendency for every issue to land on the premier's desk is exacerbated by their predictable knee-jerk reaction. Members of Queensland's inner and outer courts insisted on the importance of routines while simultaneously reflecting on the gap between this normative value and the practices of the Bligh government, especially towards the end of its tenure.
A close observer explained that 'many [cabinet] submissions were prepared outside of that normal routine … That meant there wasn't necessarily the early circulation of submissions or of the advice that was provided'. Others acknowledged the pressures, but argued the erosion of cabinet processes meant the agenda became overcrowded and the government was unable 'at a decision-making level to really prioritise what we were doing'. It is an article of faith in Queensland that cabinet should never debate 'facts': such issues should be resolved in the various coordination processes that prepare for cabinet meetings. Yet submissions were coming forward before facts and value conflicts had been resolved.
Such difficulties are consistent with experience in other core executives. Despite strong pressures for more coordination, the practice is 'modest'. It is 'largely negative', 'anchored at the lower levels of the state machine', 'rarely strategic', 'intermittent' and 'selective', 'improvised late in the policy process', 'politicised', 'issue-oriented 'and 'reactive' (Wright and Hayward 2000: 33) . A former senior official criticised Bligh's reactive ways, insisting that routines help to insulate leaders from relentless pressures: 'Every government has so many bombs going off around them, which is why you have the rock solid processes underneath, because it enables you to deal with the bombs.' Thus, both the academic literature and practitioner experience suggest coordination remains the 'holy grail' of modern government, but Queensland officials still felt beholden to try to achieve it.
Crises, coping and survival
In the British context, politicians and civil servants find the distinction between policy and management meaningless (Rhodes 2011) . Their priority and skills are about coping and surviving in a world of 'rude surprises'. They have to juggle the contradictory demands posed by recurring dilemmas. They must appear to be in control. Of course, they are not and cannot hope to be. Bligh's experience in Queensland is a case in point.
Coping and survival are the twin imperatives that confront the political-administrative elite. The demands of political accountability and the media spotlight overwhelm their interest in and capacity for longer-term thinking and planning. This is perhaps especially so as they approach a much-anticipated defeat.
This observation is as true of the Australian states as in the departmental courts of Whitehall. But the risks of implementation deficits that threaten governments' survival, and the vulnerability of premiers who try to sustain the fiction that they are in control or can 'fix' things, may be more acute in sub-national government. The much-publicised Health payroll fiasco, an IT project failure that resulted in thousands of health and public hospital workers being either not paid, or incorrectly paid, was the final nail in the Bligh government's coffin (Bligh 2015: 281-82; Wright et al. 2012: 15) . A senior ministerial staffer described it as 'the thing I personally feel most ashamed of in my time [in government]'. Another described how it exposed ministers' dependence and utter powerlessness:
there's a certain point where, as a minister, you are helpless in terms of technical stuff. You have to rely on the best advice from the department. But I think the Health payroll was a debacle in terms of public confidence in the government. You had to sit back and say, 'how did you buy this product?' How did this happen? Bligh (2015: 281) conceded the political damage this implementation problem wrought on her government:
It became for many a powerful symbol of an old government. It was a technology failure that should not have happened, and while any government would have been marked down for it, there was no mercy left for a government that should have known better after almost twenty years in the job.
Ever-decreasing circles
Controversy over asset sales led commentators to question Bligh's honesty and integrity. The fact that she had campaigned on protecting jobs, but not explicitly on asset sales dogged her administration, sapping the energy and commitment of her cabinet, which, as noted earlier, contained several rivals. The unions ran a spirited and sustained campaign against Bligh and her government. Wright et al. (2012: 14) report that:
With the government already in a politically weak position, this campaign by some unions was effective and damaging. Having previously been seen as open and transparent, the Labor Government came to be perceived as inward looking, defensive and under siege. Communications between the Government and many unions broke down and a gulf developed between the Government and large sections of the trade union movement. This robbed Labor of one of its key institutional and electoral bases of support.
One consequence of court in-fighting was an increasingly defensive leader and a siege mentality. The premier began to rely on a steadily diminishing circle of close advisers: the Strategy Group. Under the pressures of crisis and longevity the government became highly centralised. Our research suggests this was attributable to a combination of personalities and circumstances; but there were concerns too about trust. Bligh's several enemies, some of whom had indicated their intention to retire at the 2012 poll, became openly critical as the end of the government approached and the pool of available talent diminished. We asked a senior staffer, who agreed the government became centralised, why this was so: I think it's essential to get direction … Without naming names, the whole reason you become central is because you don't have the skill set around you to deliver … The whole reason it was very centralised, particularly in our government around Anna [the Premier] and Andrew [Treasurer] for example, was because they were always the smartest people in the room.
Reliance on 'inner circles' is a consequence of the trends to centralisation and personalisation noted by scholars (Peters et al. 2000; Strangio et al. 2013: 11) . The tendency to turn to a small group of trusted loyalists is characteristic of beleaguered leaders during crises and where there is division and distrust between the courts and caucus. The distrust extended to officials. So, turning inward is understandable and may help leaders to cope, but it is pathological when it becomes the standard operating procedure of governing. Such was the case under Bligh as her government faced a defeat it knew was inevitable.
After Labor's historic loss, outgoing cabinet ministers lambasted the Strategy Group. Energy Minister Stephen Robertson argued the ALP had run 'a terrible campaign', for which he blamed the party's 'inner sanctum'. He indicted Bligh, Fraser, Lucas and their advisers (ABC 2012). A former minister was similarly scathing, arguing Bligh surrounded herself with 'sycophants', 'chaotic people' who 'reinforced her prejudices'. Bligh's Chief of Staff conceded the leadership group became insular but offered a different explanation: I think that working the hours that are required [in these jobs], that you become unable toyou stop speaking to people. So, think of all the things that influence your thinking and your ability to make clear decisions … Once you are in that cocoonthis goes to the loneliness and isolation of these rolesyou don't talk to people because they always want to know what is going on. So you enclose even more, you stop being able to take on new ideas. You're not out there, at home at five o'clock, being able to watch the news or television for enjoyment; you don't talk to people at barbeques. So your ability to bring to the job all of those skills that actually you need to generate new ideasdissipate. Just through the nature of the job. Such inward looking is not peculiar to Bligh, nor to Queensland. 't Hart (2014: 76-81) distinguishes between courts as think tanks, sanctuaries, arenas and ritual. At different points over its life, the Bligh court played some of these roles. In its early days, it was a think tank over campaign strategy and budget repair. It was a negotiating arena over how to fix the IT system and hospital pay. Above all else, however, it was a sanctuary. Such 'group think' is an oft-remarked feature of Western governments ('t Hart et al. 1997) . Its core characteristics are that a group under stress becomes cohesive and insulated. It values unanimity over a realistic assessment of the available options, and it makes decisions characterised by stereotyping others, rationalising past behaviour, and belief in one's own correctness. Whether we call it siege mentality or group think, it came to characterise court politics around the Queensland premier. It was caused by a combination of perceived fiscal stress, political crises not necessarily of their own making, pressure from 24/7 media, and the personalities involved.
Conclusions
This article has examined three questions. First, is court politics a useful idea? Second, what is the nature and extent of court politics? Finally, given that local traditions shape beliefs and practices, to what extent can we apply the court politics perspective to Australian government?
Our Queensland case demonstrates the utility of the court politics perspective in highlighting the fluidity of relationships within the core executive, and the contingency and shifting allegiances that characterise life at the centre of government. Premiers, ministers, their political staff and officials occupy positions that are assumed to be powerful. Yet each is keenly aware of their dependence: on one another and on so many thingsevents, political fortunes, public opinionthat they can neither influence nor control. Beyond the interdependence of the political-administrative elites are the vagaries that arise between the tiers of government.
Walter (2010: 9-10) agrees that contingency and dependence characterise relations in the core executive, but he argues that 'court politics' implies dysfunctional decision-making. Our use of 'court politics' is different. We have no normative agenda. Rather, we seek to map, to understand and to characterise how executive politics works in Australia and to determine whether it travels well. Our work on court politics in Queensland suggests that as the Bligh government confronted defeat, decision-making was concentrated within a small, insular group. This group demonstrated many of the pathologies that Walter identifies, producing decisions that indeed did undermine the quality of government. But we would argue this represented the prevailing pattern of executive politics in Queensland then. It was not the only variety of court politics; it was at least briefly a think tank and a negotiating arena. Far from entrenching a dominant leader, the election result indicated that an administration perceived as insular and out-of-touch would get its comeuppance at the ballot box. There was a democratic correction. Moreover, the story of those dysfunctions, and the lessons to be drawn from them have entered the institutional memory of the courtthrough the narrative of the Bligh government's failings published in the review of the 2012 campaign.
We have shown that the court politics framework 'travels' effectively to the Australian context. However, we have identified some local differences that must be taken account of in seeking to apply the approach outside the UK. These differences are the colocation of network members; the greater numbers of partisan staff supporting ministers; and the close and closed relationships among network members developed over the course of long-term governments.
We started with Savoie's (2008) definition of the court as 'the prime minister and a small group of carefully selected courtiers'. We accept there is often such an inner sanctum but find Savoie's conception too narrow: participants in core executive politics are rarely so few. We prefer a broader definition that distinguishes between an inner and an outer court; between circles of influence spanning the intersecting and overlapping domains of politics, policy and administration. Like Burch and Holliday (1996: 104-06) , we see the prime minister (and premier) at the core of the core networks. However, their effectiveness depends on contingent factors, and on the personalities and preferences of key actors. Moreover, first ministers and their courts are subject to many constraints. Some ministers resist, and yet leaders must depend on these senior colleagues. No prime minister or premier can intervene continuously in everything. They are defeated by the complexity of government and the massive demands on their time. They confront the expected and the unexpected. They manage the intended and the unintended consequences of their actions. The national, and in the case of prime ministers, the international context vie for scarce attention and resources. He or she has to be selective. It is also important to distinguish between intentions and outcomes, intervention and effect. As Savoie concedes (personal interview 22 July 2014), there is much ebb and flow both within and between ministerial colleagues. The court politics approach seeks to map that ebb and flow. Notes 1. In the 2000s, there is evidence of a reinvigorated field in Australia (Bennister 2012; Strangio et al. 2013 ). 2. For a detailed account of the core executive debate, its criticisms and variants and its emergence as the 'new orthodoxy' in executive studies see Elgie (2011 ), Heffernan (2003 and Rhodes (2006) .
